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TOWARDS the end of the eighteenth century, the rapid pro-
gress of the sciences presaged a general revolution of opin-
ions. Not only had mathematics gained by the impulsion given
in the early years of the century, but also physics, chemistry, and
above all, the natural or biological sciences, had developed won-
derfully. Not to mention the French mathematicians, astrono-
mers, physicists and physiologists who rivalled Bradley, Ber-
noulli, Euler, Haller, and Franklin, natural history was revived by
Buffon and Jussieu, who extended it beyond the narrow sphere
within which specialists had hitherto confined it. By laying before
the public the great questions on natural history they became val-
uable auxiliaries to the "philosophers," even when refusing to be
considered as allies.
This is particularly true of Buffon, who was led by the plan of
his great work to treat of "the general theory of the globe we live
on, the distribution, nature and formation of the substances it pre-
sents to our view, the great phenomena which occur on its surface
or within its bosom; the history of man and the laws which pre-
side over his development, life and destruction " Among
these problems, which Buffon looked upon as unquestionably be-
longing to natural history there are a good many which only a
century earlier belonged to theology. The change wrought in
men's minds was therefore nothing else than a revolution. The-
ology was henceforward confined within its own domain; even
metaphysics was no longer in good standing, and little was ac-
cepted under that name beyond psychological and moral researches,
or at the utmost a remnant of speculation on the existence of God
and the nature of the soul. Everywhere else the scientific spirit
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asserted its supremacy. Constant use was made of positive meth-
ods, mathematical formulae and analysis, whenever the phenomena
admitted of them ; and the experimental processes applied to the
study of the genesis and formation of animate and inanimate things.
To analyze, to trace things back to their origins, was the very
spirit of the age which after having struggled in the first half of
the century had become victorious in the latter half.
We find a rather striking picture of this great movement in
the Ahges, written by Condorcet for the Academy of Sciences after
1782. Condorcet was a true son of the age, and a grateful son.
An enthusiastic admirer of Voltaire, a friend of Turgot and D' Alem-
bert, imbued with the ideas of Condillac, of the Encyclopaedists,
and even, on some points, of Rousseau, perpetual secretary of the
Academy of Sciences, and introduced into the French Academy
with the help of the "philosophers," Condorcet showed even in
what he wrote before the Revolution what he was to be when fully
developed in his last and most important work, the Esquisse du
tableau des progres de Pesprit humaiti : a passionate upholder of
the philosophy of his time, convinced that under its guidance hu-
manity was on the way to happiness. His faith was so immovable
that, when outlawed and threatened with death, his last words
were to be a rapturous hymn to progress as attained by means of
reason and science. Being an acute-minded and remarkably well-
informed man, he combined with over-sanguine hopes and previ-
sions a clear and precise insight into the social evils of his time
and the means of remedying them. By considering the body of
his leading ideas we can draw up a summary balance-sheet, so
to speak, of the philosophy of the eighteenth century in France,
on the eve of the day when the Revolution was to put it to the se-
vere test of facts.
According to Condorcet the proper object of philosophy is
man, and, secondarily, the totality of the actual in proportion as
it concerns man's development and happiness. Such a conception
may be narrow or it may be wide; narrow, if we purposely exclude
all researches in which we do not perceive man's immediate profit
;
wide, if, on the contrary, we start from the principle that all things
in the universe are mutually dependent, and that consequently the
science of man is inseparable from the study of the totality of the
actual. Condorcet stood half-way between these two extremes.
True, he had but little inclination for metaphysics. Although he
would not regard as invariable the limits assigned by Locke to the
human mind, and although he considered the questions of the sim-
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plicity, the immortality, and the liberty of the human soul, he did
not deviate notably from his contemporaries' point of view. "True
metaphysics" is to him, as to them, only the application of reason-
ing to the facts observed in reflecting upon our sensations, our
ideas and our feelings.
But on the other hand, he has no narrowly utilitarian concep-
tion of positive science. He understands that to seek immediate
utility would be to destroy the deep source of it. The most useful
theories practically are composed of propositions which were dis-
covered by curiosity alone, and which long remained useless, while
no one dreamed how they could one day cease to be so. The chain
of truths which spring from each other, and which can be succes-
sively discovered only with the aid of newly-discovered methods,
bears no relation to the series of truths which are also to become,
one after another, practically useful. A discovery is not made be-
cause it is needed, but because it is linked to other truths already
known, and because we become at last strong enough to overleap
the space between it and us. Let us then be wary lest under pre-
tence of reducing the sciences to their lowest terms we should coun-
tenance ignorance, the greatest bane of mankind and the cause of
nearly ail our misfortunes.
Conceived in this way, positive science (the principles of
which Condorcet has indeed no intention of examining) will sup-
ply a more or less rapid but a certain solution of the main prob-
lems which puzzle mankind. Man at the present time is wicked
and miserable. But his vices as well as his sufferings proceed
solely from ignorance and error, both of which science will dissi-
pate. The true use of science, therefore, does not consist in its
application to the arts, or at least this is but a small part of its
utility. Its most important benefit is perhaps that it has destroyed
prejudices, and rectified after a fashion our human intelligence.
All political and moral errors originate in philosophical errors,
which in their turn are connected with physical errors. There is
not a religious system or a piece of supernatural extravagance
which does not rest upon ignorance of natural laws. The progress
of physical knowledge is all the more fatal to such errors because
it often destroys them without even seeming to attack them.
Thus do we owe to Greece an eternal debt of gratitude. The
philosophers of Athens, Miletus, Syracuse, and Alexandria, have
made it possible for the inhabitants of modern Europe to excel all
other men. Had Xerxes been victorious at Salamis, we might still
be barbarians. That battle is one of those events, so rare in his-
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tory, in which the fortune of a single day determines for a long se-
ries of centuries the destiny of mankind. Fortunately the danger
incurred in the fifth century B. C. no longer threatens us. Barbar-
ism over the entire globe is no longer possible. Printing has for-
ever saved mankind from such a danger. We shall witness no
more " disastrous " epochs, such as the Middle Ages were. Science
not only frees, but it guarantees the man it has freed against any
aggressive return of ignorance and barbarism.
* *
We are thus brought to the central idea of Condorcet's philos-
ophy, which is the idea of progress and of indefinite perfectibility.
The expression of this thought constantly recurs in his works, con-
fident, eager, enthusiastic as a hallelujah. Every century shall
bring with it new discoveries and new instruments for discovery;
and even as Aladdin's lamp made better those who possessed it
and made a good use of it, the progress of science shall be accom-
panied by the melioration of mankind. "My aim," says Condor-
cet in the beginning of the Esquisse, "is to show, by the aid both
of reasoning and of facts, that no boundaries have been set to the
improvement of the human faculties ; that man's perfectibility is
really indefinite; and that his progress, now independent of any
opposing power, has no limit not coincident with that of the globe
on which fate has cast him." Even our bodily organism will be
perfected. With better hygiene, more sanitary houses, a more
thorough knowledge of the animal frame, the duration of life may
be increased. Death would be but the result of extraordinary acci-
dents, or of the ever later destruction of the vital forces.
The idea thus coming to its full development in Condorcet
had its roots in the philosophy of the whole century. Condorcet
merely drew conclusions from principles which had been univer-
sally accepted. How often had it been said that everything is ac-
quired, that everything comes from experience; that between the
primitive man and the man of the present day there is a wide dis-
tance, and that this distance has been covered by man with the
help of his own sole powers ! But if these have been able to lead
him up to the point where he is now, how far may they not lead
him in the future ! What may not be expected from a rational sys-
tem of education? Helvetius dreams that by this means we may
obtain "men of genius" at will. Condorcet entertains the hope
that all men will thus be made wise and benevolent. All "philoso-
phers " agreed in saying that nature "begins aright" and that if
man "continues badly," the fault is with him, and not with her.
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It is for him, therefore, to amend himself, and to rid himself of his
errors, prejudices and vices. In one word, this philosophy re-
duced to nothing the factor of innateness, instinct and heredity in
man. As a necessary consequence, it expected everything from
education, instruction and laws, and on this basis looked forward
to unlimited progress.
It is true, we are wanting in information as to the prehistoric
life of mankind. We can only guess the steps by which man, when
isolated, or rather limited to such association as was necessary for
reproduction, was able to make that primitive progress, the final
term of which was articulate language. It is only by examining
man's intellectual and moral faculties and physical constitution,
that we can conjecture how he rose to this first stage of civilisation.
At least the hypothesis thus formed is not contradicted by facts.
Moreover, according to Condorcet man is naturally good. Though
indifferent to good and evil while pursuing his own interest, he has
yet a natural feeling of pity and benevolence, a necessary conse-
quence of his constitution, which inclines him towards kindness
and justice to his fellow-creatures. This feeling always works in
the same direction, whereas self-interest counsels most various ac-
tions, so that this feeling of good-will exercises in the end a con-
siderable influence upon the conduct of men, thus contributing to
the progress of civilisation.
Whence comes it, then, that there are still so many wicked
and miserable men? Condorcet does not deny the fact, but would
not have it exaggerated. Humanity has already advanced far be-
yond the animal nature from which originally it could scarcely be
distinguished. If ignorance and errors still occasion a great many
evils, it is because nothing is so difficult as to destroy deeply-
rooted prejudices, of which mankind contracted in its childhood a
vast number, and also because there have long been classes of men
whose interest was served by maintaining these prejudices, espe-
cially priests, of whom Condorcet speaks much as Voltaire and
D'Alembert did. But mankind will eventually be cured; it cannot
fail to be cured. Superstitions and other errors will fade away be-
fore the light of science. "It would be necessary only to enlighten
people upon their real interests, and a very few simple truths




While indulging in most sanguine hopes for the future pro-
gress of the sciences, it was difficult for Condorcet to foretell in
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what this progress would consist, and he was wise enough not to
attempt it. He contented himself with pointing out the general
order of their evolution, according to which the simpler the facts
to be studied, the speedier and surer will be the progress of the
science. Thus astronomy was created first, and physiology last.
Beyond physiology, he had a glimpse of sociology. Social phe-
nomena were among his most habitual themes for reflexion. He
understood that these phenomena like all others must be sub-
jected to laws, the knowledge of which depended upon the obser-
vation of facts, and that this knowledge might become a science
which like all others would make prophetic predictions possible.
"The only foundation of belief in the natural sciences is the idea
that the general laws, whether known or unknown, which regulate
all phenomena in the universe, are necessary and unchanging.
Wherefore should this principle be less true as regards the devel-
opment of man's moral and intellectual faculties than as regards
other natural operations?" Condorcet even dimly foresaw, but
without dwelling upon it, the distinction between social statics and
dynamics, and the preponderating importance of dynamics. On
the other hand, he took up the bold idea of applying mathematical
analysis to social phenomena. He thought he had thus found a
most effective and fruitful use of the theory of probabilities.
Together with social science and with its aid, social art, which
is the supreme object of philosophers, is to be developed and
devoted to making all men free, reasonable and happy. First
free, for the better enlightened men are, the freer they are. This
proposition, Condorcet says, has the value of an axiom. Accord-
ing to the natural order of things "political enlightenment is the
immediate sequence of the progress of the sciences." But this
truth must be published cautiously, and Condorcet highly praises
the philosophers for having quieted as much as possible the sus-
picions of princes. "Let us not," he says, "challenge the op-
pressors to league themselves together against reason ; let us care-
fully conceal from them the close and inevitable connexion between
enlightenment and liberty; let us not teach them beforehand that
a nation free from prejudice soon becomes a free nation." The
throne must not know that its interest lies in supporting the altar.
Again, in order that the progress of enlightenment may pro-
duce favorable results, the progress must be general and all men
must share it. Condorcet here ventures to contradict his master,
Voltaire. The latter was wrong, he says, in speaking scornfully of
"the mob," and in thinking with his friend Frederick H. that
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"the stupid populace " has no need of enlightenment. Too long
has intellectual and moral culture been exclusively the privilege of
a minority, while the ignorant mass lies sunk in ignorance and
prejudices. In any well-governed country the people will have
time to acquire instruction and the few needed ideas to guide them
according to reason. There must be public education, extending
to all classes of society, offering to all children not so much a sys-
tematic course of instruction as the first elements of every science
useful to all men, and giving to every one a survey of the various
objects of knowledge. Society is interested in this, for in this way
no man born to genius can be lost to society, and moreover it
would be insured against the danger of seeing new prejudices con-
stantly succeeding the old ones. But above all such an education
would make men reasonable and happy by acquainting them with
their rights, duties, and interests.
Trained by science and by the use of his reason, man learns
that "his rights are written down in the book of nature." It was
formerly to sacred books, to the bulls of popes, to the rescripts of
kings, to collections of customs, to the annals of the church that
men used to turn for maxims and examples from which they might
draw conclusions. It is now well known, and has been declared
by the American republic and by France first in the Old World,
that reason is sufficient to show us the rights of man. These are
all derived from the very simple maxim that, given two sentient
beings, created equal by nature, it is against the natural order that
one of them should seek his own happiness at the expense of the
other. The question now becomes to establish on principles de-
rived from reason alone a system of laws insuring to man the en-
joyment of the advantages procured for him by the social state,
while taking from him as few of his natural rights as possible.
Now most men are in fact far from enjoying their natural
rights. Even where there are no longer any special privileges,
where the equality of men is recognised before the law, the extreme
disparity of fortunes very often makes the possession of natural
rights a vain show. Of what use is the nominal enjoyment of these
rights to a poor wretch dying of misery and starvation ? Therefore
we must found pension funds for old people and annuities for wid-
ows and orphans. A certain capital will be supplied to the young
when old enough to work for themselves ; popular credit societies
will be established. These and many other institutions of the same
kind, which may be formed in the name of society and become one
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of its greatest benefits, may also be the results of private associa-
tions.
Penal laws will cease to be a revolting anachronism in a so-
ciety the manners of which are refined. Torture will disappear.
The death penalty will be abolished. Natural children will be
treated with humanity and justice; girl-mothers will not be driven
to despair and crime ; and, finally, we shall have a new jurispru-
dence, freed from the idle trash with which the prejudices of a
score of nations and a score of centuries have loaded our law.
All these improvements will take place as education, guided
by the social art, makes men better acquainted with their real in-
terests. The improvement of laws, attending upon that of sciences,
will bring together and often identify the private interests of each
man with the common interests of all. There is no reason why the
opposition between these interests, though now a violent one,
should last forever. Man is naturally good. It is sufficient to im-
part to him gentle and pure morals, to enlighten his conscience, to
prevent the laws from creating artificial opposition between the di-
rect interests of individuals, but to cause them to develop and
strengthen man's natural inclination to make his own happiness
dependent on the happiness of others, and lastly, to prompt him to
feel towards mean, unjust or cruel deeds a somewhat organic and
reflex dislike. Reason must form laws and laws must modify
men's manners.
Men will soon understand that national interests are no more
incompatible with one another than private interests are. Accord-
ing to Condorcet there cannot exist, especially in a large empire,
any truly national interest that is not merged in the general inter-
est of mankind. All the causes which produce, embitter and per-
petuate national feuds will gradually vanish. Wars between nations,
like murders, will be numbered among the extraordinary atrocities,
humiliating and revolting to nature.
One may recognise here the dream of universal fraternity, the
humane optimism in which the eighteenth century at its close
used to indulge. But such optimism did not make philosophers
blind to the present state of misery, and their openly-avowed hopes
were one of their forms of protest against the established code of
morals and laws. This philosophy, as we have already seen, was
above all an offensive weapon. The war it waged is far from
closed ; thence the discrepancy among the opinions concerning it
even at the present day. According to some it is a poor, narrow,
paltry philosophy. It understood nothing about the history of
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mankind and was a stranger to all religious feeling, insensible to
the poetry of nature, intoxicated with the progress of science, and
practically leading to frightful excesses. According to others it is
the philosophy of a great age ; it drew conclusions from the prin-
ciples discovered or rehabilitated by the Renaissance and the Ref-
ormation; it restored to man the consciousness of his individual
dignity and responsibility; it was passionately fond of justice and
humanity; and, though it was wrong in believing problems too sim-
ple and in accepting too hasty solutions, at least it disposed once
for all of the former social conception of inequality among men,
and with the subjection of reason to theology. A weighty case
which has not yet been settled ! Time will develop further phases
of it, and the future alone can bring in a dispassionate verdict.
